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Article

JUSTICE AND THE OPTIMAL
DETERRENCE OF ACCIDENTS

Stephen A. Kiholm*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The attempt to maximize social wealth in the field of accident law
did not originate with Richard Posner and his application of economics to law. Since 1961, Guido Calabresi has analyzed the problem
of accidents with a view to reducing their costs, and like Posner he
relies on economics for that analysis.' But unlike Posner, who has

* Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Arizona State University; Ph.D. University
of California, Santa Barbara.
1. His principal works are Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law
of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to
Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1965) [hereinafter Decision for
Accidents]; Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75
YALE L.J. 216 (1965); Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability RulesA Comment, 11 J. LAW & ECON. 67 (1968) [hereinafter Transaction Costs]; Calabresi, Does
the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs?, 33 J. LAW & CoNa'EM,. PROBS.
429 (1968); G. CALABRSI, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS: A LErAL AND EcONOMC ANALYsIs (1970)
[hereinafter CosTs]; Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. Ray. 1089 (1972) [hereinafter Calabresi & Melamed];
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a"Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972)
[hereinafter Calabresi & Hirschoff]; Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE
L.J. 656 (1975) [hereinafter Optimal Deterrence]; Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law
of Torts, 43 U. Cm. L. REy. 69 (1975) [hereinafter Concerning Cause].
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made some attempt at empirical verification, 2 the economics Calabresi
offers nowhere contains a quantitative study relating a particular
system of accident control with its success at cost reduction. Rather
Calabresi's intention is to lay a "theoretical foundation of accident
law," where the principal task is in describing not solving the relevant
3
issues.
The approach provides the basis for an applied economics or costbenefit analysis. In his book The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi sets
forth the goals tort law should seek to accomplish, suggests alternative methods of achieving those goals, and then evaluates each
alternative as it relates to each goal and collection of goals. The
system which optimizes accidents, or achieves the best mix of desired
goals and subgoals, is the one then selected. Although Calabresi
never evaluates alternative methods in a quantitative sense, he compares each method in terms of its apparent economic costs and
therefore suppresses concerns like "justice" that are incapable of an
objective analysis. The result is twofold: A set of theoretical conclusions largely unsupported by fact, and a misstatement, because of
his relative neglect of justice, of the goals of tort law.
Economists observe that productive activities commonly impose
externalities upon society-benefits or costs which are not reflected
in the market price of the product of service. Accidents, being the
negative externalities of productive activity, therefore impose costs
upon society. In Calabresi's terminology there are three main types
of accident costs: primary (involving personal injuries and property
damage), secondary (consisting in the failure to compensate, or to
compensate adequately, the victim of an accident), and tertiary (the
costs of administering any system for reducing primary and secondary
costs). 4 Calabresi states that the foremost goal of accident law should
be "the maximum reduction of the sum of accident costs and the
costs of avoiding accidents that can be accomplished in a just way.' ',
Justice, then, serves as a "constraint that can impose a veto" on
any cost-maximizing system of accident law. 6 In reality, however,
this constraint proves quite unimportant, for according to Calabresi

2. See, e.g., Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEoAL STUD. 29 (1972); W.
LANDEs & R. POSNER, THE EcONOMC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987), and references cited

therein.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Costs, supra note 1, at 3-33.
Id. at 26-28.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 25.
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the very idea of what is just or unjust in the field of accident law
is greatly influenced by a system's success at cost reduction. 7 In Parts
II and III of this article I describe the implausible role that justice
plays in Calabresi's "decision for accidents."
It is significant that for Calabresi the task of accident law is not
the elimination of accidents altogether; that could be achieved simply
by prohibiting the activities that give rise to them. Instead the object
is to "optimize" accidents, whereby society induces accident-prone
but socially beneficial activities to reflect in their market prices the
costs of their accidents-to pay their way. It is with activities Calabresi
labels "useful," those that society chooses not to prohibit (though
as an inducement for an efficient level of care it will impose liability
if an accident occurs), that strict or enterprise liability is to be preferred
over the traditional fault system.8 To be sure, Calabresi does not abandon the fault principle as a criterion of responsibility, when sanctioned
by civil or criminal fines, for he argues that the principle is appropriate
for "useless" activities, or those, like speeding, that society deems
wrongful and so forbids.' But as a basic proposition strict liability
should be the dominant system of accident law since useful activities
comprise the majority of accidents."0 The distinguishing of activities
according to their usefulness, a distinction I take issue with in Part
II, forms the rationale for Calabresi's notions of "general" deterrence, where the decision regarding the level of accidents is left to
market forces, and "specific" deterrence, where government enforces
the collective judgment of society and forbids specific instances of
faulty conduct.
'Inasmuch as deterring cost inefficiency is for Calabresi the primary
task of accident law, it is not surprising that he directs most of his
criticism at the fault system and its reliance on the principle of
"corrective justice."'" By favoring economic analysis over the approach commonly used in tort litigation- the close reading of cases
7. Id. at 296-97. See also Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 1,at 1078.
8. Decision for Accidents, supra note 1, at 719-20.
9. Id. at 718-19.

10.

Id.

11.

The principle of corrective justice derives from Aristotle in Book V, Chapter 4, of
his Nichomachean Ethics (M. Ostwald trans. 1979). It states very briefly that regardless of the

wealth or virtue of either party, where one person wrongfully injures another, he must make
compensation in order to restore their relationship to a prior condition of equality. See
Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAw & Prin. 37 (1983) (for its

application to c6ntemporary tort law). But cf. Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful
Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 421 (1982); Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent
Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1981).
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and statutes for the rule of law thought applicable to a given fact
situation-Calabresi rejects a particularized determination of liability. As a matter of general deterrence, he views the issue of accident
cost reduction from the perspective of "activities," not individual
actors. The object, then, is to impose nonfault liability on those
"categories" of accident-prone activities, such as automobile manufacturers, which are the "cheapest cost avoiders"-those parties best
situated to make a cost-benefit analysis as to whether accident costs
are worth avoiding and to act on that decision. 12 Calabresi admits
that the search for the cheapest cost avoider will sometimes rest with
the victim rather than the injurer class and that the imposition of
strict liability is not without exceptions. 3 He argues, however, that
since the goal is efficiency, the focus should be on those accidents
that are recurring not on the isolated case, and so not on indivi4
dualized relationships between injurer and victim.'
Therefore the question of "fairness between the parties," which is
the exclusive concern of corrective justice and of the fault system, is
not on this reading the proper inquiry for accident law. Indeed the
justice Calabresi speaks of is not justice as between discrete litigants

but rather the "community's sense of justice," which he regards as
broadly utilitarian, consisting in wealth efficiency and its equitable
distribution.' This article, to the contrary, defends the fault system
and the principle of corrective justice rooted in case-by-case adjudication. I argue below that fault liability, when coupled with a social
insurance scheme for uncompensated victims, provides for adequate
deterrence, fairer compensation, and imposes no greater administrative costs than would a system of nonfault liability. More importantly,
unlike nonfault, the system I propose vindicates the sense of fairness
implicit in requiring that injurers, to the degree possible, compensate
their victims in proportion to their wrongdoing. The article describes
and offers one solution to the problem of synthesizing corrective
with distributive justice in the field of accident law, and it outlines
the limited role wealth and utility may play in tort litigation. I argue,
in conclusion, that efficiency is subordinate to enforcing the legal
rights and expectations of isolated parties and is consequently of

12. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 1060; CosTs, supra note 1, at 135.
13. CosTs, supra note 1, at 135; Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 1060-74; Optimal
Deterrence, supra note 1, at 666-71.
14. CosTs, supra note 1, at 135.
15. Id. at 291-92. See also Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald
Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 553, 553-62 (1980) [hereinafter About Law and Economics].
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secondary importance to the rule of law-treating alike those parties

who are similarly situated.
II.

A.

ACCIDENT COST REDUCTION

General and Specific Deterrence

Although less committed than Posner to a free market economy
for achieving efficient accident control, Calabresi nevertheless depends heavily, but at times inconsistently, on the central idea of
general or market deterrence. Indeed were it not for the ability of
the market to direct consumer behavior to an optimal level of
accidents, Calabresi argues that the best solution to the accident
problem would consist in a social insurance system supplemented by
criminal sanctions. 16 In that scheme, social insurance would reduce
the secondary costs of victim compensation, while criminal sanctions
would reduce the primary costs associated with the number and
severity of accidents.
However, assuming the feasibility of general deterrence, Calabresi
insists that it would be preferable to rely on that method of control
for most types of accidents. This is so because he views accident law
from the perspective of multiple goals, each of which impinges upon
the others. Given the complexity of goals, where the object is to
achieve the best combination of each, a social insurance system is
inadequate since it fails to deter accidents; it achieves the goal of
secondary cost reduction only at the expense of reducing primary
costs, a separate goal. For example, product manufacturers who
know that users who are injured will be compensated from a social
insurance pool regardless of the manufacturer's fault or insurance
contribution, will have little incentive to invest in cost-justified safety
precautions. Similarly, criminal sanctions (the collective determination
of liability) will be useful in deterring accident costs only in those
cases where it is certain that the injurer class is the cheapest cost
avoider. Calabresi often points out that accident victims will sometimes be in a better position than injurers to decide whether the costs
of the accident should have been avoided, and that in other cases
neither the injurer nor victim but some third party will be in the
best position.' 7

16.
17.

Cosrs, supra note 1, at 6-7, 66-67, 312-13.
See, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 1067.
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As an illustration, in a collision between two automobiles it may
be that neither driver but instead the automobile manufacturer was
best situated to decide the issue of accident cost avoidance. However,
were courts to impose liability on automobile manufacturers without
exception, that practice too would be inefficient. For Calabresi
reasons that in other accidents involving automobile driving, say a
car-pedestrian collision, it may be more efficient to build a pedestrian
overpass, or to rely on some other solution, than to impose liability
on the automobile manufacturer. He writes that the fault system and
case-by-case adjudication, "because it centers on the possible particular cost avoider, is very likely to ignore the recurring cost avoider
and hence fail altogether to consider some potential cheapest cost
avoiders such as highway builders or tire-makers."' 8
Therefore, according to Calabresi, the decision whether to rely on
general or specific deterrence will depend, first, on the type of
accident or accident-prone activity (both reduce to the issue whether
the accident-causing activity was useful or useless), and second, on
the degree to which it is certain or judged to be certain that one
party is in fact the cheapest cost avoider with respect to that accident
or activity. The method of general deterrence relies on voluntary
market transactions, induced by the threat of civil liability, whereas
specific deterrence opts for government regulation of acts or activities,
such as traffic rules or safety laws. Calabresi concludes that a mixed
system of general and specific deterrence is desirable, with the proportion of each being a mixed factual and political question. 9
Unfortunately, as critics of Calabresi have observed, 20 the distinction between general and specific deterrence is at best problematic
and indicates, in part, his wavering endorsement of the market.
Calabresi assumes that because individuals undervalue the risk of
accidents they will fail to adequately insure against an accident's
occurrence.2'Therefore he assumes that insofar as a free market will
fall to promote safety, public regulations serve as a necessary deterrent. However, it might be argued that traffic ordinances do not, as
18. COSTS, supra note 1, at 256 (emphasis in original). See also Decision for Accidents,
supra note 1, at 719-20.
19. CosTs, supra note 1, at 178, 180, 312.
20. See, e.g., Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American

Tort Theory, 9 J. LErAL STUD. 27, 38-47 (1980) [hereinafter Englard]; Michelman, Pollution
as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647 (1971)
[hereinafter Michelman]; Posner, Book Review, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 636 (1970) [hereinafter

Posner].
21.

CosTs, supra note 1, at 55-64, 206, 220.
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he says, reflect a dissatisfaction with the level of accidents determined
by the market, but instead have arisen only because the state is the
exclusive owner of traffic highways. Assume, as Professor Posner
has hypothesized, a situation where all roads are privately owned.
He writes, "One would expect the highway owners to establish rules
of the road, speed limits, and the like for the same reason that auto
manufacturers installed some safety devices even before they were
required by law to do so: in order to promote use of their product
by meeting the user's demand for safety." 2 2 Posner asserts, and I
concur, that in an unregulated economy with respect to a given act
or activity the level of safety can be negotiated on the basis of
voluntary private contracts. The point is not to argue for the feasibility of private contracts in all cases, 23 but only to show that safety
regulations, and so specific deterrence of faulty conduct, can in
principle be determined by market rather than by collective means.
Calabresi is also mistaken, it seems fair to conclude, in his suggestion that market deterrence will fail to insure safety because
individuals are "risk preferrers," and because they often lack adequate information to make a rational decision for or against accidents. 24 With respect to a psychology of high risk preference, Calabresi
assumes without question that it correctly describes rational behavior
in the marketplace. Economic theory, however, does not posit any
preference for risk that holds uniformly for all individuals and types
of activity. And social theorists who have attended to the degree of
risk taking in the rational selection of political institutions differ

widely in their conclusions. While a rule of "expected-utility maximization" permits high risk taking where the probability of an
undersirable outcome is low, John Rawls' "maximin rule" of rational
choice requires that in all cases we select the best alternative among
worst-case scenarios. In comparison with Calabresi's psychological
25
assumptions, a rational person is for Rawls highly risk averse.
Moreover, it is equally doubtful whether collective interference is
necessary in a competitive economy to rectify consumer ignorance of
safety hazards. Again, following Posner, if we assume that buyers
22. Posner, supra note 20, at 641.
23. Later in this article I propose a social security compensation scheme for victims of
nonnegligent injurers.
24. See CosTs, supra note 1, at 55-64, 206, 220.
25. See generally Harsanyi, Can the Maximin PrincipleServe as a Basis for Morality? A
Critique of John Rawls' Theory, 69 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 594 (1975) (defends a decision rule
of maximizing expected utility); J, RAwLs, A THE o Y oF JusnicE (1971) (for the maximin rule

that seeks to improve the position of the least favored social strata).
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and sellers can privately contract for safety, it seems likely that a
seller's competitor will inform prospective buyers of the dangers
associated with the first seller's product. By a competitive exchange
of information, consumers will often have sufficient information with
which to make a rational decision, and so the argument that safety
regulation cannot be achieved except through specific deterrence is
simply untrue.
The criteria for selecting one form of deterrence over the other is
far from obvious in Calabresi's writings. Often his arguments are
confusing and seem contradictory. 26 For example, he writes that juries
and case-by-case determinations of liability are not essential to an
adequate system of either general or specific deterrence and that
neither are they essential in a system, as he favors, that mixes the
two approaches.2 7 But since his own system will at times rely on tort
fines as a means of deterrence, he has to later acknowledge that
"tort fines would be accompanied by the expense of case-by-case
determinations."8 Thus, his earlier statements to the contrary notwithstanding, case-by-case determinations are essential in the nonfault
system he proposes. In another context, Calabresi argues for imposing
nonfault liability on the product manufacturer "because he is the
party who can, by actions reasonably to be expected, reduce the
risk." 29 But in the next footnote he states, "[i]t may be that the
producer is not the cheapest cost avoider in the long run, and this
needs to be kept in mind in deciding whether to impose liability." 30
The confusion surrounding general and specific deterrence has led
one commentator to remark that their intended use is as "a mere
convenience in organizing discourse-as a compendious descriptive
terminology through which we can refer to fluid and overlapping
combinations of regulatory techniques."'" But the distinction between
forms of deterrence is not, in my view, simply one of "decentralizing" and "centralizing" regulatory functions. To the contrary, their
use reflects a significant normative decision implicit in a theory which
purports to be comprehensive and value-free. The point to be made
in this context is that the single-minded striving for an efficient
"market" deterrence of accidents undermines any attempt to do

26. See Englard, supra note 20, at 44-45.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

CosTs, supra note 1, at 286-87.
Id. at 287 n.2.
Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 1071 n.57.
Id. n.58.
Michelman, supra note 20, at 661.
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corrective justice in isolated cases. Admittedly, the specific deterrence
of accidents makes some attempt at justice-at linking injurer with
victim on a moral plane-but as we see below, it is not synonymous
with the fault system and is based, as it implies, on deterrence not
rectification for harm caused. Further clarification of the distinction
between the forms of deterrence, best characterized by "useful" and
"useless" activities, lends support to the position that market efficiency is a value often antithetical to corrective justice.
With general deterrence, the object is to impose prospective liability
on broadly defined classes of activity rather than on a particular
individual who, judged retrospectively from the accident's occurrence,
was negligent in his conduct. 32 Courts (or legislatures) will in this
view devise categorical rules of nonfault liability based on statistics
correlating an activity, say automobile driving or product manufacturing, with types of accidents. For instance, a rule might state that
automobile drivers are presumptively liable for the costs of collisions
between cars and bicycles, and similarly for lawnmower manufacturers in relation to lawnmowing injuries. Classes of activity may

themselves be divided into subcategories of activity if subcategorization results in greater accident deterrence. Thus automobile driving
may be isolated to impose accident liability only on driving which
occurs at night, or we might distinguish between steel and aluminummade lawnmowers, so that a manufacturer's liability will depend on
its choice of construction and the relative accident-proneness of those
materials.
By imposing nonfault liability on an activity or subcategory of
activity, those responsible for accidents will be prompted to alter
their behavior-e.g., by reducing night driving, or by substituting
steel for aluminum-made lawnmowers. Activities and subcategories
which carry a high accident risk will become progressively more
expensive, perhaps even pricing themselves out of the market; and
producers (or consumers), acting in response to a change in price,
will opt for safer, less expensive substitutes. The underlying principle
is that by focusing on statistical accident "involvement" instead of
isolated faulty conduct, activities and their subcategories will be made
to reflect their true social costs. Calabresi summarizes his market
approach to "useful" activities as follows:
The best way we can establish the extent to which we want to allow
such activities is by a market decision based on the relative price
32.

See, e.g., CosTs, supra note 1, at 68-94, 135-73.

279
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of each of these activities and of their substitutes when each bears

the costs of the accidents it causes. This can be done by a system
of nonfault enterprise liability, a system that assesses the costs of
accidents to activities according to their involvement in accidents.
By contrast, our fault system, with insurance, assesses the cost of
an activity not according to the number of accidents it causes but
according to the number of accidents it causes in which certain
predetermined indicia of fault can be attributed to it. This results
in a deterrence of only faultily caused accidents in an area where
by hypothesis we are interested in deterring activities not because
of some moral implications but because of the accidents they cause."
With specific deterrence, it has been noted, Calabresi states that the
object is to reduce "useless" acts or activities, those where injurer
fault of carelessness is involved. 34 Here courts (or legislatures) vindicate the collective judgment of society by forbidding what is deemed
too likely to cause an accident or is not otherwise socially desired.
Typically, a specific deterrent will take the form of a penal law
which forbids specific conduct; they are cases, like drunken driving,
where the doer of the act has sufficient control over his conduct that
it can be avoided in the future. A political judgment is made that
the behavior will not be permitted even if the doer is willing to pay
for ensuing accident costs. In these cases, real or potential victims
are protected by what Calabresi calls a rule of "inalienability":
injurers may not cause accidents upon the condition that they compensate for them. 35 Thus drunken driving or driving without an
operator's license or vehicle safety inspection are forbidden because
of the perceived correlation between those activities and subsequent
accidents. In other, less frequent examples of specific deterrence,
those where the doer has insufficient control over his conduct to
warrant a criminal penalty, the imposition of civil liability-the
payment of money damages-will be appropriate. Here victims are
are permitted
protected by a "liability" rule, or one where injurers
36
to cause accidents provided they make restitution.
Hence, for Calabresi, not all specific deterrents will consist, like
drunken driving, in forbidding the activity. Some activities may
merely be taxed, to reduce their frequency, while others-those
thought to promote safety-may even be subsidized. Society may,

33. Decisionfor Accidents, supra note 1, at 719-20.
34. See id. See also CosTs, supra note 1, at 95-129, 174-97.
35. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092-93.
36. Id. at 1092
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for example, pay young or old-age automobile drivers not to drive,
or to drive less often, if it finds that those age groups contribute
disproportionately to accidents. Specific no less than general deterrents may divide accident-prone activities into subcategories, like age
groups, to achieve maximal effect. Specific deterrents are distinguishable in that they coerce accident prevention rather than leave it, as
with general deterrents, to individualized market judgments. They
may reflect unusual certainty by society that injurers (or subcategories
of injurer activity) are, for a given accident or accident type, the
cheapest cost avoider, or they may reflect a moral or aesthetic, i.e.
"nonmonetizable," judgment that some act or activity should not
be allowed.
But the separating of activities according to their usefulness is
implausible, as critics have argued, since the category of useful
activities comprises only those accidents that, under the fault system,

are deemed "unavoidable." 37 Unavoidable accidents, of course, are
those that are unintended and could not have been prevented by the
exercise of reasonable care. 8 Historically they account for a very
small fraction of all accidents, for in most cases some human
carelessness or negligence is involved. Yet in applying Calabresi's
analysis, where careless conduct can be singled out as an accident's
cause, we are left with a useless act requiring specific not general
deterrence as the appropriate means of prevention. Moreover, for
Calabresi the presence of any carelessness in an otherwise useful
activity will necessarily convert the latter into a useless one, again
requiring specific deterrence. Thus his warranted reliance on the
general deterrence of accidents-the showpiece of his theory-is
considerably lessened.
The conclusion that useful activities are limited to unavoidable
accidents is based on Calabresi's assumption that there are a great
many activities "whose undesirability consists only in the fact that
they result in accidents and then only to the extent that people would,
if they knew the costs of these accidents, prefer to abstain from the
activity rather than pay those costs." 3 9 They are activities which
"comprise the bulk of the decisions as to accidents" and so account

37.

See, e.g., Englard, supra note 20, at 41.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEErON oN THE LAW OF TORTS 162-64 (,V.
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON];
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 55-85 (Epstein, Gregory & Kalven 4th ed. 1984) [hereinafter

38. See W.

EPSTEIN].

39.

Decision for Accidents, supra note 1, at 718.
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for the importance of general deterrence. 4° But with rare exception
are not almost all accidents the result of human failures which can
be isolated and described-speeding, inattention, or improper equipment? 41 The undesirability of these damage-causing activities involves
not merely their outcome but their root cause in avoidable human
neglect. And even in cases where we are uncertain as to an accident's
cause or decide that it is too costly to inquire, if there exists even
some small element of fault in a basically useful activity the appropriateness of general deterrence breaks down.
In describing how accident costs are affected by general deterrence,
Calabresi suggests the case where a hypothetical driver could reduce
his accident rate by using a different kind of brake in his automobile. 42 He argues that the threat of civil liability creates an incentive
for the driver to make his activity of driving safer, and that that
form of accident prevention is less costly than specifically deterring
faulty driving. Nevertheless, it seems that if the driver were to cause
an accident despite the installation of new brakes, the cause most
likely would rest with a specific faulty act, either by the driver or
by the person he injures in acting carelessly. In that event, although
general deterrence (the installation of new brakes) was more appropriate for the activity of driving, the presence of fault would convert
the activity into a useless one and thus invoke, according to Calabresi,
specific deterrence. Calabresi entirely overlooks that the incentive to
act more safely assumes that individuals can predict in advance the
cause of an accident and therefore prevent its occurrence. Surely that
measure of controllability is lacking in most accidents, which are
more likely the result of unpredictable human error.
In general, we may question whether dissimilar accidents are equally
amendable to an efficiency analysis in terms of cost-avoidance categories. Although product manufacturers may be induced to make
their products safer if they were routinely held liable for the injuries
their products caused, the same incentive is unlikely to be found,
e.g., with automobile drivers. 43 For the latter, accidents happen
seldom if at all; they can hardly be deemed a common cost of doing
business with a large consuming public. Safe automobile driving

40.

Id. at 718-19.

41.

See, e.g., Englard, supra note 20, at 43; Posner, supra note 20, at 645; G. Wrm,

TORT

LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 221-23 (1980) [hereinafter WITE].

42. COSTS, supra note 1, at 73-74.
43. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 41, at 223; Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr.
Calabresi: Auto Accidents and GeneralDeterrence, 34 U. Cm. L. Rav. 239, 250 (1967).
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involves careful attention and some physical ability, neither of which
are reducible to any kind of cost-benefit calculus. Indeed, an automobile owner might invest heavily in safety precautions and still be
physically incapable of driving safely, avoiding those accidents he
had a cost-incentive to avoid.
Finally, there appear to be some damage-causing activities, like
industrial polluting, that are intentionally engaged in, yet, when
optimally produced, are socially desired and beneficial. 44 The problem
for Calabresi is that under his theory if society wished to reduce the
level of pollution it would either have to specifically deter a useful
activity, manufacturing, or else generally deter an activity whose
undesirability, excessive pollution, is "nonaccidental." The polluting
manufacturer, to be sure, is fully aware of the consequences of its
behavior, -and there is no fortuity, as with accidents, in the nature
and extent of any damage. Again, contrary to Calabresi, there are
very few activities whose undesirability consists only in their causing
accidents (the intentional production of unwanted pollution suggests
as much), and so added doubt is cast upon the plausibility of his
distinction between general and specific deterrence.
The Critique of the Fault System

B.

The reliance on general deterrence of accidents represents Calabresi's unique contribution to the field of tort law. The fault system,
insofar as it focuses on the issue of fairness between parties and
case-by-case determinations of liability, is based for the most part
on the specific deterrence of accidents, though if Calabresi is correct
it does a poor job even at that. For it does not deter wrongful acts
regardless of accidents, he points out, but only accidents where some
wrongful act, judged after the fact, was the cause-a much narrower
category. 45 In addition, whatever general deterrence results from faultbased liability is for Calabresi unintended, and in any event depends
on marginally efficient private insurance contracts. 46 His argument is
that if we wish to reduce the costs of accidents then we are better
off in the majority of cases in not specifically deterring faulty acts
but in generally deterring, through nonfault enterprise liability, classes
of accident-prone activities. Consequently, the importance of injurer

44.

See, e.g., Englard, supra note 20, at 42 n.60; Michelman, supra note 20, at 666-67,
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responsibility toward discrete accident victims-the position favored
in this article-is expressly rejected. Calabresi's assumption of market
efficiency rather than corrective justice as the appropriate judicial
norm is the value judgment referred to earlier as implicit in his
distinguishing the forms of accident prevention.
The efficiency judgment is implicit because Calabresi fails to defend
adequately the value of efficiency. Most of his arguments against the
fault system are based on the view that fault serves as a poor method
of optimizing accident costs. But he also argues that it is not required
by justice. 47 The justice he has in mind is not corrective justice
between isolated parties, as I propose. Rather it is a kind of distributional fairness-the principle of not singling out individuals with
accident costs unreflective of their responsibility for them. Having
outlined the goals and methods of accident control, in which justice,
as he defines it, serves as a constraint, Calabresi appraises the fault
system with each of these goals and methods in view. He concludes
that the fault system is outmoded, "absurd," and so "ineffective"
4
that any one of several substitutes would be preferable. 1
For example, he argues with respect to reducing secondary (victim
compensation) costs that the fault system unfairly places all of the
costs of an accident on either of two parties: the injurer, if he was
negligent, or the victim, if there was no injurer negligence or if the
victim was contributorily negligent. This, he says, may result in
serious economic hardship if the party left with the costs is not
privately insured. 49 A more equitable system would spread the costs
of accidents throughout society generally to reflect the full measure
of its responsibility for those costs. What is more, the argument
continues, private insurance begets problems of its own. Calabresi
maintains that it often is inadequate for compensating victims because, as we saw, individuals tend to underinsure; that it may result
in "externalizing" accident costs from the cheapest cost avoider,
since, if parties are insured, they have little incentive to take costjustified precautions; and that it requires costly and time-consuming
court litigation, thereby increasing the administrative (tertiary) costs
of the system and needlessly delaying victim compensation. Presumably, a system of nonfault enterprise liability would compensate
victims immediately and so reduce the administrative costs associated
with case-by-case determinations of fault.

47.
48.
49.
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The fault system fares no better, according to Calabresi, in optimizing primary accident costs. 50 He states that its success in that area
depends on the commercial feasibility (usually lacking) of private
insurance carriers in establishing, for purposes of client rate-schedules, subcategorization of risk groups; that it fails, as we saw, to
impose liability when it is warranted on entire classes of injurers or
on blameworthy third parties not brought into litigation; and that
the concept of "fault" itself is loaded with an antiquated moral
connotation (a view of "inward" injurer culpability requiring retribution) that prevents our developing efficient accident solutions.
Accordingly, he rejects the fault system's "simplistic bilateral view"
of the accident problem, in which accidents are "incidental events
linking one victim with one injurer," and argues instead that accidents
are part of a more general social problem of reducing the costs
associated with them consistent with our sense of justice.5 1 So if
justice requires (as it appears to) that innocent victims be compensated
and that injurers be penalized in proportion to their wrongdoing, it
does not for Calabresi necessitate the fault system. Rather, both
justice and efficiency suggest the appropriateness of a social insurance
pool for victim compensation to be supported by requiring that "all
parties involved in similar accidents divide all the injury costs according to a scale of relative guilt.''52 This means, in summary, that
where society is certain that an activity is undesirable it will impose
noninsurable civil or criminal penalties regardless of accidents, and,
where it is uncertain, it will devise actuarial categories for charging
"different groups different amounts in relation to the relative desirability or blameworthiness of the activities in which they are en53
gaged."
I propose in the remainder of this section to defend the fault
system against the charges that it is inefficient and unfair. Consider,
first, the fault system's method of compensating accident victims,
namely, private liability insurance. Calabresi is correct, in part, in
criticizing the insurance industry because of its processing of auto54
mobile accidents. As Professors Keeton and O'Connell have shown
the modern practice of insurance has been to shift accident costs
from the most accident-prone drivers to the least. They point out

50.
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that in most schemes of traditional "third party" insurance (where
a driver is responsible for the damage he may cause others), private
carriers are compelled by law to insure, at near average rates, highrisk drivers that would not otherwise be covered; and that it is only
the premiums paid by the carriers' safer policy holders, by far the
larger number, that allow the insurance industry to operate at a
profit. Consequently, in that setting the fault system with insurance
probably does encourage greater accident costs.
But that form of state-compelled insurance, which encourages
accidents, is not the only alternative open to the fault system. For
example, society could require that drivers obtain private liability
insurance at the competitive rate for their appropriate risk group. 55
Presumably drivers who are very young or very old would pay higher
premiums than those in the middle years, and owners of sports and
luxury cars would have higher rates than those with less obtrusive,
more moderately priced ones. With effective rate-scheduling in place,
society, if it chose, could then deny the privilege of driving altogether
to those drivers whose poor risks prevent their paying for the higher
premiums that would ensue. In this alternative scheme, each driver
would indeed pay for the true accident costs of his driving. And so
Calabresi's objection to private insurance-that it insufficiently subcategorizes risk groups-would be remedied by effective public regulation of the insurance industry. It is, as Posner suggests, the
inadequate form of state regulation and not the fault system that is
the major weakness in the traditional handling of victim compensation.
Inasmuch as Calabresi underscores the inadequacy of private insurance as it now exists, his approach to reducing secondary accident
costs appears to be twofold. First, he would impose nonfault enterprise liability if the injurer was the cheapest cost avoider, in which
case the victim would (presumably) be compensated. But he would
let the costs fall upon the victim if the latter was the cheapest cost
avoider. In either case, his approach to victim compensation is as a
mere byproduct of the primary cost reduction inherent in general
deterrence, and it is therefore dependent upon that deterrent's feasibility. Second, he would compensate victims from a fund supported
by penalties for faulty conduct, on the model of specific deterrence.
There are a number of areas, in my judgment, where the fault
system, buttressed by a comprehensive social security scheme, would
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provide for greater victim compensation. One of the principal short-

comings of the various nonfault automobile compensation plans is
that accident victims are denied recovery for some types of injury;
namely, intangible items like pain and suffering, loss of consortium,
and lost earnings.5 6 By dispensing with case-by-case adjudications (in
order to avoid lengthy delays in compensation), nonfault plans have
the disadvantage of denying victims of their common law right to
sue for full rectification of their injuries. Under nonfault plans,
damages are computed from a statutory schedule, rather than apportioned to the loss suffered by a particular plaintiff. So, for
example, a lost finger is worth a predetermined amount, say $3500,
whether it be the finger of an average person, for whom recompense
might be adequate, or a concert violinist, for whom the loss may
affect his livelihood and who therefore will receive inadequate compensation. A victim under nonfault, declares one author, receives a
"minimum recovery which is often but a small portion of the damage
57
he has suffered and to which he is entitled" under the fault system.
In contrast, the fault system permits victims to sue to recover the
entire measure of their damages provided injurers are to blame.
Two other areas where the fault system might enhance victim
compensation are in cases where injurers are not negligent or "at
fault," and in cases where victims are the cheapest cost avoider. In
the first instance, a victim in Calabresi's theory would only be
compensated if the injurer, though nonnegligent, was the cheapest
cost avoider. In the second instance, the victim would not be compensated.

As an alternative theory, one which compensates victims not provided for by Calabresi, suppose the fault system, with private liability
insurance, were supplemented by social security payments. Those
payments, funded through general taxes, would be designed to compensate all accident victims regardless of injurer or victim fault or
cost avoidance potential. Compensation systems quite similar to that
proposal have been established in England and in many other foreign
countries .58
It is also the theory advocated by Professors Blum and Kalven.5 9
They maintain that the accident problem involves two connected
56. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, at 606-08; EPsTIN, supra note 38, at 949-85
(providing a general discussion and references to the critical literature).
57. DeParcq, Comment: In Defense of the Fault Principle, 43 MINN. L. REv. 499, 506
(1959) [hereinafter DeParcq].
58. Id. at 508.
59. W. BLUMi AND H. KALVEN, PuBLIc LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEMAuTo COMPENSATION PLANS (1965).
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principles of justice.6 On the one hand, since victims of automobile
accidents have suffered a personal misfortune, there appears no basis
for treating them any different from other accident victims: Both
groups, they insist, should be entitled to relief as a matter of general
welfare to be paid for out of a fund for social security. On the other
hand, justice also implies that losses from automobile accidents
should be shifted, if possible, to the class of negligent motorists
responsible for them, so that if negligent motorists can be identified,
accident losses would not lie with victims or as a charge to society.
Therefore they argue, as a matter of justice, that we distinguish
between responding immediately to a victim's needs, with social
security, and then deciding, at a trial, who under the fault principle
should ultimately bear the loss. They summarize their proposal as
follows:
The social security approach could be used to underwrite relief for
those in need without allowing any recovery over by the welfare
fund. Victims of faulty drivers, however, would be left with their
common law actions intact, subject only to deduction for welfare
payments which they have received from the fund. Under such an
arrangement, losses below a certain level would be borne by the
public generally and would be allocated wholly without regard to
fault, while losses above that level would be allocated according to
the fault principle-some remaining on victims and some shifted to
6
drivers as the principle dictated. '
The interesting feature of this proposal is that, as the authors
state, it responds to a private law problem with a public law solution:
The undercompensation of accident victims characteristic of the
existing fault system is remedied by a tax-based expansion of
government welfare entitlements. It is equally significant that we
could use the tax system to redress existing iniquities in accident-cost
burdens. Under the proposed scheme, society could impose a commensurately higher tax upon those individuals or groups who benefit
the most from automobile driving. 62 Presumably, automobile and
product manufacturers would pay more for accidents than they do
now, thereby vindicating the "deep pocket" and "loss spreading"
principles of insurance that Calabresi argues are required by distributional fairness.
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Be that as it may, it is worth noting that Calabresi does not favor
reducing secondary accident costs if, by so doing, we impose a
greater net social cost. Indeed, he states that future debate over
accident reform will likely center on the tradeoff, not between fault
and nonfault liability, but between those proposals which favor
greater victim compensation, based on social insurance, and those,
like his own, which emphasize primary cost avoidance based on the
optimal mix of general and specific deterrence. 63
But would Calabresi's theory, if adopted, lead to substantially
fewer and less severe accidents than the fault system accounts for?
I believe that it would not. Consider his objection that in deciding
tort cases judges under the fault system look only at the relative
abilities of the parties before them to minimize accident costs, where
in reality a third party not a trial may be the cheapest cost avoider.
In my view that objection is misleading. For under the fault system
a party charged with causing harm may seek to prove that not he
but someone else was in fact responsible. The defendant's plea of
innocence becomes part of the central issue of "reasonable" conduct.
According to the test of reasonableness, it is not dispositive in terms
of liability that the defendant at trial injured someone; for it allows
a court to conclude that the party truly "at fault" may have been,

for instance, not the defendant-driver, but the automobile manufac-

turer, the highway contractor, or the designer of the traffic signals. 4
Assuming that were true, the defendant may be absolved of liability,
or perhaps he may be charged as a joint tortfeasor and seek contribution from the other responsible parties. In any case, there appears
no reason for concluding, as does Calabresi, that the fault system is
incapable of handling complex problems of causation of harm.
Moreover, if at trials involving similar types of accidents the
responsible parties were continually identified and held liable, then
insurance companies could begin to isolate accident-prone activities,
individuals, equipment, and so forth, and establish the appropriate
premiums. 65 Since it is far from obvious that private liability insurance, properly regulated, is inadequate to the task of efficient subcategorization of risk, or that individuals systematically undervalue
the potential for accidents, I believe that the kind of market-ruled
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deterrence of accidents Calabresi argues for can effectively be achieved
through the fault system.
Calabresi also objects that the fault system performs poorly in
specifically deterring faulty conduct because it judges accident costs
only ex post. 66 His argument is that courts determine fault in a
factual setting only after an accident has occurred, where the judgment can be of little use as a deterrent. The implication is that risky
conduct that does not cause an accident is left unpunished, thereby
failing to prevent future accidents. By this interpretation, however,
Calabresi has largely distorted the fault system. For he neglects to
mention that historically the fault principle and civil liability have
67
operated in conjunction with a separate system of criminal justice.
The specific deterrence of faulty conduct, regardless of whether it
results in an accident, is therefore implemented, and properly so, in
the forum of the criminal courts. This dual system of civil and
criminal liability for wrongful behavior suggests, in contrast to Calabresi, that the unique goal of personal injury law is not one of
"deterrence," since that is achieved by criminal sanctions, but rather
one of "corrective justice." Professor Englard has, in my view,
accurately captured the underlying rationale for tort liability when
he writes,
The person aggrieved seeks redress through the court. In suing, the
victim is interested in obtaining, here and now, personal compensation. In the ordinary case his concern is not deterrence of the
wrongdoer-certainly not in relation to other possible victims. Against
this background, the traditional fault system makes good sense: the
blameworthy injurer is duty-bound to compensate the injured plaintiff, who may or may not derive additional retributive satisfaction
from the official imposition of personal liability on the defendant.
In the case of an innocent injurer the loss lies where it falls. 61
To reemphasize, Calabresi rejects charging personal responsibility
to an injurer for a particular victim's misfortune. In dismissing the
corrective justice account of liability, he seems to have adopted a
theory of relativism about "costs" and "causes." For example, in
an article appraising "What Is a Cost of What Activity," Calabresi
asks rhetorically "Is a pedestrian-auto accident to be attributed to
driving or walking? "69 His conclusion is that the issue is not a
66.
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"metaphysical search for ultimate causes" but is instead a problem
of financial accounting, of "apportioning the costs of an accident
among those activities that caused it. "70 Elsewhere he calls the concept
of "cause" a "weasel word, ' 71 referring to the fault system's malleable concept of proximate cause, and insists, as we have seen, that
it be replaced with the concept of statistical accident "involvement"the search for the cheapest cost avoider.
Calabresi does not disparage the substantial factual difficulties
inherent in finding the cheapest cost avoider. 72 He suggests general
guidelines, often rather complex, for selecting the activity responsible

for an accident, and in troublesome cases for making "educated
guesses"; and he acknowledges his indebtedness to Ronald Coase in
the analysis of bargaining, transaction costs, and in his own "best
briber" solution. 73 But apart from the problems of complexity and
uncertainty-ironically the same problems which he says beset the
doctrine of proximate cause-the significant point is that, according
to this view of responsibility, an automobile driver who has harmed
another did not "cause" the accident. Rather it resulted from the
activity of automobile driving, say, or from some feature in automobile or highway manufacture or design, so that liability will rest
with the improper activity, assuming it can be isolated, and not with
a particular injurer. Since it is most likely, in my opinion, that the
search for the cheapest cost avoider is as a practical matter unmanageable, and that nonfault systems of liability undercompensate accident victims and require innocent third parties to subsidize faulty
drivers' misconduct, I oppose in this article abandoning the fault
system's use of proximate cause for determining liability.
We arrive, then, at the third area of accident cost reduction that
for Calabresi the fault system fails to accomplish, namely, administrative costs involved in the processing of accident claims. 74 Since in
his theory general deterrence is appropriate for most accidents, caseby-case determinations of liability are usually absent. An enterprise
charged with responsibility for an accident will normally have no
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choice but to pay for the accident costs, and so the process of
adjudication is greatly simplified. However, the theory does provide
for exceptions to nonfault determinations of responsibility in the
sphere of general deterrence, and these exceptions, if consistently
adhered to, arguably swallow up the rule.
In defending a standard of strict liability, Calabresi argues that its
applicability will vary with the type of accident-prone activity. For
example, he says that with blasting and other ultrahazardous activities
the court decision that the blaster is best suited to make the costbenefit analysis for or against accidents is imposed at a high level
of generality: "the decision contemplates virtually no exceptions so
long as the injury arises out of the risk which makes the activity
ultrahazardous. ' 75 But with the activities relating to product manufacturing-the area of strict products liability-he concedes that the
judgment that "producers are better suited than users to make the
cost-benefit analysis is deemed much less generally applicable, and
the manufacturer is allowed to try to show in each specific case that
the user was in the best position to make the analysis." 76 Similar
exceptions apply in the area of worker's compensation, where "extrasensitive" workers are judged to be the most appropriate party to
decide upon the risks of their employment.
With the activities of automobile manufacturing and driving, exceptions are also permitted. One must suppose that the manufacture
of automobiles is a category of products liability, where Calabresi
admits "a fair degree of case-by-case analysis is worthwhile. '77 And
we have seen that the regulation of automobile driving consists partly
in specific deterrence, in which case-by-case determinations of fault
are essential. Individualized evaluations are no less likely, it appears,
in the use of general deterrence, for Calabresi accepts the propriety
of "assumption of risk" as a defense to strict accident liability. 78
Thus, in his view, a driver who injures a pedestrian may not be
liable, even under a nonfault rule to the contrary, if the pedestrian
unreasonably exposed himself to the risk of harm. The same is true
for drivers who misuse their automobiles in a way that the manufacturer could not reasonably have anticipated. The assumption of
risk defense is based on the awareness that a nonfault rule will
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sometimes create inefficiencies in the behavior of potential victims,
since if they are compensated in any event, they will have no incentive
to avoid the costs of their own accidents.
These various exceptions to nonfault liability clearly indicate that
despite the superior cost avoidance potential of the injuring party,
he may choose to litigate the issue of liability whenever a plausible
defense of assumption of risk-a frequently used defense in the fault
system-can be made out. Assuming this is correct, the congestion
of the court system will not be lessened. For if enterprises who are
the best cost avoiders can be denied liability by showing that in a
given accident they were unable to exercise their potential, a comparison of relative fault between parties is required which necessitates
court intervention. And as this comparison is no different from that
which occurs in negligence cases, there exists no basis for preferring
the standard of strict liability. 79 Moreover, apart from the issue of
determining relative fault, there is the problem for Calabresi that in
choosing betwen the general and specific' deterrence of a given
accident, courts apparently must make highly detailed and individualized factual judgments. It seems, accordingly, that the areas
where a nonfault standard of liability will result in optimizing administrative costs may be very limited indeed. On the other hand,
the corrective justice view of tort law that is proposed in this article
implies that administrative cost reduction is a far less significant issue
than vindicating our sense of fairness in isolated cases of personal
injury. As one author has concluded, I think correctly, "there is no
more important work [that the civil courts] can do than hear the
' 8
claims of the widowed and the maimed."
III.

UTILITY, FAnRNESs, AND THE RULE OF LAW

In Calauresi's scheme, justice is relegated to a decidedly background role: It serves as a constraint, he says at one point, in
reducing the sum of primary, secondary, and tertiary accident costs
rather than as a goal. 81 In The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi equates
the fairness of the fault system with vengeance for an injurer's
misdeed, and he identifies the injurer's wrongdoing with subjective
moral culpability. 8" Quite apart from whether he was wrongly identified the fault system with retribution, and moral culpability with
subjectivity, one may take issue with his unargued assumption that
79.
80.
81.
82.
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efficiency is the predominant judicial goal of tort litigation. In my
judgment efficiency (or social utility) will usually yield to other values,
like fairness between parties and equal treatment for those similarly
situated. Since neither Calabresi's nor Posner's "economic" theories
provide any criteria for determining when efficiency should accede
to other values (Calabresi's invokes intuition), one may only conclude
that a decision favoring efficiency has been presumed. I accept efficiency or social utility as a value of tort law, though largely a subordinate one, and so the issue reduces to describing its appropriate role.
This Part rejects Calabresi's account of fairness and offers one very
general solution to the problem of incorporating social utility within
a framework of corrective justice.
Calabresi writes that any system of accident law must be "just or
fair" and that it must "reduce the costs of accidents." 83 He reads
this to mean that justice serves as a potential veto on any system of
cost reduction but that justice and efficiency are not to be "traded
off.' '84 There are two, sometimes confusing senses in which he uses
the term justice. In one sense the term relates to fairness in the
distribution of social wealth, as one ingredient among others in a
broader conception of a just society. He takes the position that courts
should achieve the right blend of wealth maximization, its equitable
distribution, and "other justice" notions, so that distributional fairness may apparently veto a cost-efficient accident scheme.8" Equitable
wealth distribution is not, however, synonymous with justice in this
view. 86 In the second, broader sense of justice the term relates. to the
aim of effecting a "just society." It is, what he elsewhere denies, a
"goal," in which the right mix of efficiency and its distribution are
the "instruments.87
Calabresi refers in this context to Ronald Dworkin's distinction
between policies and principles.88 He argues that judges rely on both
sets of standards, though more often the first, with policies being
based "on that mixture of efficiency and distribution that in the
particular context is thought by the court to be instrumental toward
justice and, in particular, does not violate any fairly precisely defined
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rights or veto points."89 He rejects the view that wealth maximization
is the exclusive concern of tort law, since gains in wealth must also
be distributed fairly, so the question is how these "instruments"
relate to the acknowledged goal of a just society.
Professor Dworkin persuasively suggests that Calabresi's theory is
a "compromise" theory-it advocates a compromise or trade-off
between social wealth and an equal, or at least equitable, distribution. 90 He reasons that since Calabresi accepts distributional fairness
as a component of value, something "valued for its own sake," he
must also independently value social wealth: One cannot trade off
or mix one value for the other unless both are separately desired;
hence the notion of a compromise. Dworkin concludes, I think
plausibly, that Calabresi values social wealth as a surrogate or "false
target" for total utility, and therefore that the "right mix" for
Calabresi consists in the highest possible aggregate utility coupled
with an equitable distribution. Accordingly, Dworkin calls Calabresi
a "teleological utilitarian," because he values highest average welfare,
but he says that he is only "partially" one, since distributional and
"other justice" notions may operate as rights constraints. 91
Dworkin, finally, contrasts Calabresi's view of justice with his own
conception, a view he labels a "recipe" rather than a "compromise"
theory. Under that theory, which he says is based on the principle
of treating people as equals, there is no independent value, as before,
in either aggregate utility or wealth equality. The "right mix" of
wealth and its distribution is primary, not derivative of the attempt
to maximize, and so trade off, each of two separate values. Hence
the notion of a recipe, for Dworkin remarks that an increase in
either value (or ingredient) beyond the mix called for in treating
people equally is counterproductive. The contrast between his own
and Calabresi's conception helps underscore the values implicit in
corrective justice. Dworkin writes,
For the compromise theory the question of justice is a question of
balance, and the balance is both impersonal and intuitive. Impersonal because individuals become the instruments of achieving aggregate quantitites-of equality as much as of utility. Intuitive
because the correct balance must be a matter of inarticulate 'feel.'
For the egalitarian theory, on the other hand, the question of justice
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is a matter of fairness person-by-person rather than fairness of
aggregate sums-and one's judgment about fairness to persons
depends on judging arguments for a particular result, not on striking
92
intuitive and indeterminate aggregate balances.
The issue of wealth distribution is, in my view, inadequately dealt
with by Calabresi. We have seen that equity in distribution comprises
part of his notion of justice, but at other points in his writing he
assimilates wealth distribution to his account of economic "costs."
He states that the principles of accident cost spreading and deep

pocket insurance (both of which he joins under the heading of
secondary accident costs) can be distinguished from economic efficiency but not because they are inherently normative or nonmonetizable. "We do indeed trade off some economic efficiency for
spreading," he says, "but we do this because in a peculiar way we
believe we are comparing costs and not ... because we are willing
to give up some fairness for economic efficiency.'" 9 So he acknowledges not a trade-off between justice and efficiency but rather a
comparison of monetizable costs. Elsewhere he states that avoiding
undesirable changes in income distribution may properly be treated
' 94
as part of "cost reduction.
Unfortunately, in each of these assertions what Calabresi has
attempted to do is isolate some distributional issues from "fairness,"
rename them "costs," and then claim that the object is to minimize
costs without concern for where those savings or burdens might fall.
As Professor Steiner in commenting upon Calabresi's work has
written, "This [assimilation] is just another way of describing a costbenefit analysis, which compares total losses to total gains without
regard to their incidence." 95 It is worth observing, in addition, that
since the goal according to Calabresi is to maximize the market value
of economic output, he must operate within the framework of the
existing distribution of wealth and resources. Therefore, by conjoining justice notions with costs, he presupposes that the existing distribution is "fair." If the thesis of this article is correct, the normative
issue of distribution is a basic issue he must, but has yet to address. 96
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93. Calabresi & Bass, Right Approach, Wrong Implications: A Critique of McKean on
ProductsLiability, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 74, 75-77 (1970).
94. Costs, supra note 1, at 24 n.l.
95. Steiner, Economics, Morality, and the Law of Torts, 26 U. TORONTo L.J. 227, 241
(1976).
96. Although Calabresi acknowledges that the initial distribution of resources is different
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What relationship is there, then, between cost reduction and fairness in tort law? Calabresi maintains that they are initimately related
and that for most accidents since strict enterprise liability optimizes
costs, it is a fortiori the fairest system. He regards "fault" or
negligence as a moral concept, though several tort scholars (Hand,
Coase, and Posner, among others) have interpreted it entirely in
economic or utilitarian terms. In this section I describe one avenue
of reconciling the Kantian corrective justice position I defend
elsewhere 97 with the concern for maximizing social wealth.
Many legal writers, including the authors of the Restatement of
Torts, account for liability by arguing that the injurer violated the
victim's "interest." 98 We may, according to this view, classify interests in various ways-e.g., an interest in property, in reputation, or
in privacy. But it is preferable, it seems, to view an interest more
basically, as something in which a person has a genuine stake. An
interest has been defined as the "most general term that can be
employed to denote a right, claim, title, or legal share in something. ' 99 For Joel Feinberg, an interest is "something a person always
possesses in some condition, something that can grow and flourish
or diminish or decay, but which can rarely be totally lost."' 1 He
goes on to say that the advantage of this interpretation is that it
"permits us to appraise harms by distinguishing between more and
less important interests, and between those interests which are, and
those which are not, worthy of legal recognition and/or protec-

from their efficient allocation, he wrongly states that, for economic theory, the former should
promote the latter. He writes, "Economic efficiency asks that we choose the set of entitlements
which would lead to that allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense
that a further change would not so improve the condition of those who gained by it that they
could compensate those who lost from it and still be better off than before." Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 1, at 1093-94. This description is in fact the "Kaldor-Hicks" criterion
of efficiency, which is a highly value-laden and disputed concept. It is not, as implied,
mainstream positive economic theory. Nonetheless the Kaldor-Hicks concept has been interpreted by a federal court as the rationale for Calabresi's "best briber" guideline for identifying
the cheapest cost avoider. Under that test, courts in cases of uncertainty are to impose liability
on the party who can most easily transact with the true cheapest cost avoider, if a mistake is
made, for purchasing the latter's entitlement. In Union Oil Company v. Oppen, a Santa
Barbara oil spill case, the court held that this capacity to "buy out" another's right was the
"real focus" of Calabresi's approach, which the court then adopted. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,
501 F.2d 558, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1974).
97. S. Kiholm, Political Theory and Modem Tort Law (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California, Santa Barbara (1985)) (on file at Pacific Law Journa) [hereinafter

IHOLM].
98.

99.

100.

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 1 (1965).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 729 (5th ed. 1979).
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tion.' '' 1 For Feinberg interests are distinguishable from, say, property
rights in that they not only have "weight" but they are malleabletheir relative importance may vary over time. They are also distinguishable from what he calls claim rights and manifesto rights. We
may, in Feinberg's view, account for liability by invoking the concept
of violating a "legitimate interest"-one worthy of legal protection,
but one that is entirely context dependent.
The variance over time in the legitimacy of a purported interest
allows, I submit, arguments of cost efficiency or utility to play a
role in determining liability. In my judgment there are two levels of
inquiry that courts must deal with in tort cases. At one level-the
level of distributive justice-courts must decide upon the initial system
of property rights, including the separate question of rights of
ownership. Here the consideration of efficiency or utility may properly impinge upon the decision to award one party the entitlement
to act, or to be unencumbered by another's action, but it is not
dispositive. Indeed I believe, following Marshall Shapo, 02 that the
need for redressing inequalities in bargaining power between opposing
litigants will take precedence over the value of cost reduction-it is,
in other words, a weightier social interest. Shapo's position, with
which I agree, is that judges in tort cases should assess the relative
equities of the parties and impose liability in accordance with moral
or political arguments of fairness. His reasoning is that those parties,
like large corporations or government entities, which control greater
power-in resources, information, or access to courts-may misuse
that power in ways harmful to those in inferior and dependent
positions. Such power-based mismanagement will therefore carry a
defeasible presumption of liability.'0 3
Professor Shapo denies that tort judges should balance opposing
interests from the standpoint of aggregate utility (as Calabresi argues),
since maximizing social wealth is not always consistent with achieving

101.
102.

Id.

M. SHmpo, TEE DUTY TO AcT-ToRT LAW, POWER, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1977)
[hereinafter SaApo].
103. It is arguable that the best justification for a strict liability rule in cases of ultrahazardous activities, products liability, and worker's compensation is this notion of inequality.
There is no necessary inconsistency in defending the fault system for use in some activities,
like automobile driving and medical malpractice, while denying it in others. And it is interesting
that the justification for strict liability in the accepted cases may be rooted in contract values,
not those of tort. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 20, at 640-41. As was noted earlier, despite
their acceptance of the fault system, the compensation scheme of Blum and Kalven-which I
favor-allows for a tax-based recovery for accident victims of nonblameworthy conduct.
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the fair resolution of a case; in fact, he correctly points out, the two
values may often conflict. 1°4 This is especially true where, as under
the aforementioned Kaldor-Hicks criterion, the court decision will
turn on which party has greater wealth with which to purchase the
sought after legal entitlement. But assuming distributional fairness is
not in conflict, both Shapo's and my own position hold that judges
may look at any impact on social wealth, whether favorable or
unfavorable, as one reason among others for adjudicating a tort
dispute.
On my account, maximizing utility is a subordinate value to
redressing inequities in power at the level of distributive justice, but
utilitarian values may at times be relevant and perhaps even controlling. The "reasonableness" test of the fault system I would favor
for most accident-related activities is not self-defining, and the court
determination of which litigant to a case has the stronger interest is
often a difficult task. It is difficult because courts must be able to
respond to change in our social environment, and so enhance utility,
but they must also operate within an institutional setting whereby
their decisions affix rules of law from which individuals may make
rational expectations for guiding their behavior. As the literature
critical of the law-and-economics movement has shown,' 5 the morality of utilitarianism (or a more narrowly defined wealth maximization) at some point conflicts with personal autonomy and the
respect for persons, for if legal entitlements are determined solely by
the vagaries of a utilitarian (or wealth maximizing) calculus, parties
whose factual circumstances are no different from prior litigants may
not be similarly treated by the courts. If the "rule of law" means
anything, it is the entitlement of persons to have their behavior
governed by rules publicly fixed in advance.
A plausible solution to this dilemma is to view the entitlement of
stare decisis as defeasible: it operates only until such point as heavily
adverse consequences for social utility, or perhaps distributional
equity, militate against its observance. Stephen Munzer defends a
position that permits retroactive disruption of legal expectations in
cases where those expectations are neither "rational" nor "legiti-

104.

Siio, supra note 102, at 49, 51, 71.
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See, e.g., Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the Foundations

of the Economic Approach to Law, 94 ETics 649 (1984); R. DwoRKmI, A MATTER OF
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mate." °6 His theory contains a complex account of when expectations
should or should not be protected, and it is based on a mixed ethical
system of utility and Kantianism. In Munzer's view, retroactive rule
making carries a special burden of justification, especially when, as
with criminal law or procedure, it affects personal liberties. On the
other hand, he says that retroactive laws affecting private property,
especially laws which redress gross distributional inequities, are more
easily justified. His basic point, which I accept, is that strongly
undesirable consequences for either utility or distributional fairness
may "disentrench" certain legal expectations. And so a person's right
to have his case follow the rule of law is prima facie only, though
if this account is correct, it will be rare when a case will not.
At the level of distributive justice, where courts determine the
strength or legitimacy of competing interests, utility competes with
other values, like redressing the misuse of power or the inequity of
wealth distribution or achieving doctrinal consistency, for consideration. In my view, the mismanagement of power which culminates
in a civil injury will warrant prima facie liability, and, in exceptional
cases, serve social disutility or wealth-distributional inequity will
permit discarding judicial precedent for a given factual setting.
The second level of court inquiry I would argue is indispensable
for tort adjudication-that of corrective justice-is designed to vindicate the legitimacy of the winning litigant's interest and hence
restore the system of legal entitlements to its prior equilibrium. This
is the realm of fairness between the parties and enforcement of the
rule of law. It depends on case-by-case decisionmaking and so bars
direct appeal to social utility or wealth maximization. Most importantly, it views judges as law appliers rather than as law makers.
In a constitutional democracy such as our own, judges are not,
like legislators, publicly elected and accountable officials. Therefore,
in my opinion, they are obligated by social norms to conform their
decisions with existing judicial precedent. On my account-which is
shared in part by Professors Dworkin and Rolf Sartorius' 07 -courts
are duty bound in adjudicating cases, even hard ones, to declare
preexisting legal rights and thereby strengthen the security of legal
expectations.108 In this view, there exists a uniquely correct judicial
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decision for any given factual description, or at least judges should
proceed on the assumption that there is. Speaking for myself, utility
or cost-efficiency may play a part in court decisions if earlier cases
not recanted justify their use; but then their use in a factual setting
would be generally known in advance and there would be nothing
unexpected in the decision on the basis of which a losing litigant
could claim unfairness.
My point here is that utility or wealth may be relevant at the level
of determining the legitimacy of competing interests, but without
supporting what Dworkin calls arguments of "policy." Doctrinal
consistency and arguments of "principle" will almost always prevent
courts from maximizing utility or wealth for the benefit of some
collective goal in an ad hoc fashion. I therefore propose that we
distinguish corrective from distributive justice for the purpose of
emphasizing that court deliberations in tort cases should focus on
achieving fairness between discrete litigants. Apart from that distinction, which I think is important, 1°9 it is uninteresting whether tort
judges do or should perceive their task as consisting of two "levels"
of inquiry.
One final distinction worth noting, which follows from the previous
one, is the distinction between "interests" and what Professor Feinberg calls "claim rights." 110 With the position I have described, once
an interest is deemed "legitimate" the person who possesses that
interest acquires a "claim right," as defined by Feinberg, against
anyone who might infringe it; and so the victim of an accident may
demand compensation, as of right, against his injurer. In this view,
a claim right vindicates a legitimate interest; it is the species of which
the interest is the genus.
The significance of the concept of a claim right is that it serves
as a claim one holds against a specific individual and it arises out
of a specific wrong. Feinberg, for example, distinguishes claim rights

rule, or institution by its effect upon social utility-will support social norms that exclude
direct appeals to utility because their acceptance provides greater security of expectations and
therefore greater long-term utility. SATouous, supra note 107, at 118.
109. It is important because some tort scholars, like Christopher Arnold, wrongly interpret
the substantive content of corrective justice as utilitarian. Professor Arnold argues that "ideal"
theories of distributive justice, like Rawls' or Dworkin's, cannot account for the utilitarian
values often called for in identifying and remedying civil harms. He separates ideal distributive
theories from his own, more adaptable theory of corrective justice. According to my position,
in contrast, it is distributive justice which accounts for utilitarian values, while I reject their
use in an "ideal" theory of corrective justice. See Arnold, Corrective Justice, 90 ETmcs 180

(1980).
110.

FEiNBERG, supra note 100, at 58-61.
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from "manifesto rights," where the latter are purported rights-to
health care, education, or a decent standard of living-that do not
correlate with duties imposed on a specific individual and do not
result from an isolated occurrence of wrongdoing."' Claim rights, I
submit, are in one sense more important than interests in that they
provide for victims a needed measure of self-respect. They characterize the moral value of claiming something in one's own name,
which is the basis perhaps of personal autonomy and human dignity.
The argument for allying compensation with victim claim rights forms
the groundwork for my rejection elsewhere of a now-popular justi12
fication for nonfault automobile insurance.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

An economic or deterrence rationale for accident liability, as
supported by Calabresi, contrasts markedly with a theory of liability
that focuses on injurer particularity and responsibility. This article
has indicated that the theory of corrective justice warrants imposing
liability as a means of redressing violations of the prior equality
between affected parties. I have argued that corrective justice, accurately viewed, particularizes the issue of injurer fault, so that
blameworthy injurers, and they alone, are held responsible for compensating victims of their untoward conduct. Therefore I have suggested a theory in which-with the exception of accident losses
occasioned by nonblameworthy conduct-a victim's right to recompense correlates directly with his injurer's duty to repay. The proposed theory is rooted in moral responsibility, not culpability or
retribution; and though accident deterrence and victim compensation
are consequences of liability, they are not its sole justification. I
have argued that despite Calabresi's disclaimers, the fault system,

with case-by-case adjudication and a well-designed scheme of liability
insurance, in fact accomplishes most of the goals Calabresi sets out
for any system of accident law. This article has concluded that the
most important of those goals is not efficiency or an optimal deterrence of accidents but rather the protection of individual autonomy.

111. Id. at 67.
112. Kiholm, supra note 97, chapter III.

